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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
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v.
BRIAN DAVID MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)

NO. 43914
ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2015-317
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brian Martin contends that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
a sentence with an excessive fixed term and refused to retain jurisdiction over the case.
In regard to his argument on the decision to not retain jurisdiction, the State argues the
information which indicated Mr. Martin had a prior mental health diagnosis, and which
was not considered in the Mental Health Examination or the district court’s sentencing
decision, was not credible or was unimportant.
The State’s arguments are not only unfounded, but miss the ultimate point.
Mr. Martin’s potential to be successful on probation if his mental health issues were
properly evaluated and addressed in light of that information, could be assessed during
1

a period of retained jurisdiction. Therefore, the district court’s decision to not retain
jurisdiction because it felt there was nothing it could learn by doing so was mistaken
regardless of how reliable the unconsidered information was. Pursuant to statute, the
district court still had to take that information into account in the sentencing decisions.
Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Martin’s sentence and remand this case
for a new sentencing hearing where the district court can retain jurisdiction.
Alternatively, it should reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Martin’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
ISSUE
Whether the district court imposed an excessive sentence on Mr. Martin.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Imposed An Excessive Sentence On Mr. Martin
A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Retain Jurisdiction
The district court needs to consider the defendant’s mental health issues when

making sentencing decisions. I.C. § 19-2523; Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581
(1999). The mental health evaluator in this case was operating on the understanding
that Mr. Martin “has not been diagnosed by a doctor, nurse, or counselor with a
psychological problem.”

(Mental Health Evaluation attached to PSI, pp.1-2.)
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She

concluded, “[u]nless evidence exists that contradicts this information, no follow-up
mental health treatment or mental health evaluation is recommended for this
defendant.” (Mental Health Evaluation, p.2 (emphasis added).) However, evidence
which contradicts her understanding of Mr. Martin’s mental health issues, specifically
that he has a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia, exists in the record. (See Addendum to
PSI; 2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ-284 pp.1, 6.) Thus, the caveat is in effect and the district
court’s reliance on the Mental Health Evaluation’s recommendation during sentencing
was misplaced.
The fact that the State disagrees with just how reliable the evidence of
Mr. Martin’s prior diagnosis is (see generally Resp. Br., pp.3-6) does not change that
conclusion.

First, the State’s attacks on the credibility of that information are

unfounded.

For example, there is no evidence in the record which would suggest

Mr. Martin’s ex-wife is unreliable, that she was mistaken in, or had fabricated, her
statement to the current PSI evaluator.1 In fact, she gave the same information to the
Michigan presentence investigator in 2004. (2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ-284, p.6.) The
fact that she has made the same statements over the course of twelve years actually
indicates her more recent statement is reliable. Cf. I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) (allowing the
admission of prior consistent statements to rebut challenges of recent fabrication).
The State also contends that, because Mr. Martin denied any current symptoms,
the information about his prior diagnosis is not reliable or is unimportant. (See Resp.
Br., p.5.) The State’s argument fails to appreciate the nature of mental health issues.
Just because Mr. Martin may not be currently experiencing or displaying symptoms
She certainly did not need any medical degrees to offer her understanding of what
Mr. Martin’s prior diagnosis to have been. (See Tr., p.16, Ls.5-18.)
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does not mean there is no issue to be taken into account. Furthermore, it is ironic that
the State relies on Mr. Martin’s current self-disclosures as the reliable touchstone for
understanding his mental health situation, and yet, argues there is no reliable
information about the prior diagnosis by citing to the 2004 Michigan PSI’s account of
Mr. Martin’s self-report of his prior diagnosis.

(Compare Resp. Br., p.5 (“he is not

amenable to treatment, as evidenced by his outright denial of any mental health
problems”); with 2004 PSI, CFJ-284, p.12 (“The defendant reports having mental health
issues that had not been addressed until October 2003 when he went to Toledo, Ohio
for mental health treatment. The defendant states that he has been diagnosed with
schizophrenia and bipolar. However, this information is unverified.”) Therefore, the
State’s arguments about the perceived unreliability of this information in the record are
mistaken and should be rejected.
At any rate, the fact that evidence of a prior mental health diagnoses exists,
regardless of how reliable the State believes that information to be, undermines the
entire conclusion in the Mental Health Evaluation. (See Mental Health Evaluation, pp.12 (evaluating Mr. Martin specifically on the basis that there were no reported prior
history of diagnoses); see also GAIN-I (providing more detail of the examination which
served as the basis for the mental health evaluator’s conclusions).) This is why the
mental health evaluator included the caveat – if there were indications that Mr. Martin

The State cites to its renumbered “Michigan PSI, p.3” in reference to the unverified
nature of Mr. Martin’s disclosure. (Resp. Br., p.4.) It appears this citation refers to form
CFJ-284, p.1, if the two pages of form CFJ-145 are pages 1 and 2 in the State’s
renumbering system. (See Resp. Br., p.4 n.1).
2
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had a previous diagnosis, the conclusions would have been reevaluated in light of the
potential that there was an underlying issue. (See Mental Health Evaluation, p.2.)
And even if the State’s credibility arguments have some validity, those arguments
only go to the weight of that information.

They do not alleviate the district court’s

obligation to consider that information as required by I.C. § 19-2523, to weigh it in its
sentencing decisions. I.C. § 19-2523 (“Evidence of mental condition shall be received,
if offered . . . .”) (emphasis added); cf. Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581 (“[Idaho Code] § 192523 requires the trial court to consider the defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing
factor.”). As the district court refused to consider the information about Mr. Martin’s
prior diagnosis because it mistakenly believed it was his ex-wife’s own opinion of his
condition, rather than her recounting of a historical fact within her knowledge, the district
court did not meet this obligation. (See Tr., p.16, L.5-18.) Again, this is the whole point
of the caveat the mental health evaluator included in her report – if there is other
information about Mr. Martin’s mental health issues, the evaluator would need to
reconsider her recommendations in light of that information.

(See Mental Health

Evaluation, p.2.) Whether a subsequent evaluation would rule out or confirm the prior
diagnosis is irrelevant. In either case, the district court would have a more accurate
understanding of Mr. Martin’s mental health issues in imposing sentence.
Finally, the State’s arguments do not address the ultimate question – whether
this information impacts the district court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction. (See generally
Resp. Br.) Even if there is some question as to the reliability of the information about
Mr. Martin’s previous diagnoses, if there are underlying mental health issues, they need
to be taken into account in the sentencing decision. See I.C. § 19-2523; Hollon, 132
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Idaho at 581.

The district court did not consider such issues in refusing to retain

jurisdiction; rather, it explained, “I simply don’t know what I would learn on a rider report
that would change my view on the appropriate sentence in this matter.” (Tr., p.17,
Ls.4-7.) However, Mr. Martin’s potential to be successful on probation, if his mental
health issues are properly evaluated and addressed, could be assessed during a period
of retained jurisdiction.

Thus, there was information that could have been learned

during a period of retained jurisdiction that could impact on the decision of whether to
place Mr. Martin on probation. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App.
2005) (“The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial
court to obtain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential
and suitability for probation.”). Therefore, the ultimate point is that the district court’s
decision to not retain jurisdiction without accounting for Mr. Martin’s mental health
issues as the record fully presents them constitutes an abuse of its discretion. The
State’s arguments do not address, much less change, this conclusion. As such, this
Court should still provide the required relief.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Aggregate Sentence
With An Excessive Fixed Term
The State’s responses concerning the excessiveness of the term of Mr. Martin’s

aggregate sentence are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in
regard to those issues. Accordingly, Mr. Martin simply refers the Court back to pages
7-8 of his Appellant’s Brief.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Martin respectfully requests this Court vacate his sentence and remand this
case for a new sentencing hearing where the district court can retain jurisdiction.
Alternatively, it should reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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